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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Probation officers searched the residence of Tamara Brunko, a probationer they suspected
had relapsed on heroin and absconded. Mark Garnett was in the residence at the time of the
search, having stayed the prior night as a guest of Ms. Brunko’s boyfriend. An officer found
Mr. Garnett’s closed and locked backpack in a storage area, bypassed the lock by severing an
attached elastic strap, opened the backpack, and discovered a handgun. Mr. Garnett argues on
appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the officer did not
have an objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Garnett’s backpack belonged to Ms. Brunko, and
its search was therefore not authorized by Ms. Brunko’s Fourth Amendment waiver. 1
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues, inter alia, that Mr. Garnett did not preserve
his argument that the “reasonable belief” standard articulated by the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), is the proper standard of review,
and further argues that the “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated by the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728 (2002), is the proper standard of review. The State’s
arguments are without merit.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Garnett’s Appellant’s Brief, and are repeated in this Reply Brief only where necessary to
address the State’s appellate argument.
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Mr. Garnett also argued that the search could not be justified based upon a reasonable suspicion
that Ms. Brunko violated the terms of her probation. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-18.) The State
has chosen not to address this issue in its Respondent’s Brief. (Respondent’s Brief, p.10, fn.3.)
1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress?

As such, Mr. Garnett relies upon the arguments he made in his Appellant’s Brief as it relates to
this issue.
2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Garnett’s Motion To Suppress
Mr. Garnett argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because Officer Haines did not have an objectively reasonable belief that
Ms. Brunko had common authority over Mr. Garnett’s backpack, such that the search could be
justified by Ms. Brunko’s consent to search in the form of her probationary Fourth Amendment
waiver. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-15.) In making that argument, Mr. Garnett pointed out that the
district court used an incorrect standard of review; namely, a “reasonable suspicion” standard.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-13.) Mr. Garnett acknowledged that the district court relied upon the
Idaho Supreme Court’s Opinion in Barker, but argued that standard was inconsistent with the
standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, which controls questions
of apparent authority to consent searches. Id.
The State mischaracterizes Mr. Garnett’s legal argument as a “ground for suppression”
and asserts it is not preserved for appeal. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.6-7.) The State’s argument is
without merit, as Mr. Garnett did not raise a new ground for suppression in his Appellant’s Brief.
On the contrary, Mr. Garnett has maintained throughout that his “ground for suppression” is that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his closed and locked backpack,
and that the State failed to show there was a valid exception to the warrant requirement,
authorizing the search.
In his motion to suppress, Mr. Garnett asserted, “[t]he evidence must be suppressed
because Mr. Garnett had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal belongings, the
search was not pursuant to a lawful search warrant, and the search did not occur pursuant to a
lawful exception to the warrant requirement.” (R., p.38.) Mr. Garnett argued in his brief in
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support that the, “[t]he warrantless search of … Mr. Garnett’s backpack did not occur pursuant to
an exception to the warrant requirement,” and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of his backpack, even though it was found at Ms. Brunko’s residence. (R., pp.40.,
43-45.)
Having the burden of providing a valid exception to the warrant requirement (see
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)), the State asserted the search was
justified by Ms. Brunko’s Fourth Amendment waiver, noting that “a third party may consent to a
search, thereby relieving the government of the warrant requirement, as long as such person
possessed authority – either actual or apparent – to consent.” (R., pp.50-51 (citations omitted).)
The State relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758
(9th Cir. 1991), for the proposition that officers must have a “reasonable suspicion” that an item
to be searched is owned, controlled, or possessed by the probationer, in order for the item to fall
within the permissible bounds of a “probation search.” (R., pp.54-55.) Although recognizing
that the Davis Opinion was based upon reasonable suspicion that a probationer violated the terms
of his probation (“a reasonable suspicion search”), and not based upon a probationer’s Fourth
Amendment waiver, the State claimed the Barker Court extended the exception to “include
consent to search a home,” and argued, “[i]t appears the same reasonable suspicion test applies to
both.” (R., pp.55-56.)
After the hearing on his motion to suppress, Mr. Garnett filed an addendum to his brief in
support, concluding as follows:
Based on Mr. Garnett's reasonable expectation of privacy in his zipped,
locked backpack, the State’s lack of authorization under Ms. Brunko’s Terms and
Conditions of Probation, lack of warrant, and lack of consent from Mr. Garnett,
the evidence seized as a result of the search of Mr. Garnett’s backpack should be
suppressed.
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(R., p.89.) In its response brief, the State argued it met its claimed burden of showing the Officer
Haines had a “reasonable suspicion” that Mr. Brunko owned, possessed, or controlled the
backpack, based upon the evidence presented during the suppression hearing. (R., pp.95-97.)
The district court recognized that the State argued “Officer Haines had a reasonable suspicion to
believe Brunko owned, possessed, or controlled the backpack, meaning that Brunko had the
apparent authority to consent to that search,” applied Barker, and found the State met the burden
articulated in that case. (R., pp.109-111.)
In sum, Mr. Garnett has consistently claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of his closed and locked backpack, and that the State failed to prove the
search was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. The district court held the
search was lawful, finding Ms. Brunko had apparent authority to consent to the search based
upon a “reasonable suspicion” that she owned, possessed, or controlled Mr. Garnett’s backpack,
and that she did consent through her probationary Fourth Amendment waiver.
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Garnett argued that under the “reasonable belief” standard
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, the State failed to show
Mr. Brunko had the apparent authority to consent to the search, and the district court’s ruling is
erroneous. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-15.) Mr. Garnett noted the district court based its decision
upon the Barker standard, and argued both why Barker was wrongly decided (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.12-13 (it was based upon a misunderstanding of Davis)), and why the Rodriguez standard
applies (Appellant’s Brief, p.13 (United States Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment)). Admittedly, Mr. Garnett’s trial counsel did
not point out the flaw in the Barker decision to the district court, but this is simply not relevant to
any issue before this Court.
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Parties on appeal are not limited to reciting verbatim the arguments they made in the
district court. Although new substantive issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, the
specific arguments the parties make in support of their legal theories may “evolve” between the
lower court and the appellate court. Ada County Highway District v. Brooke View, Inc., 162
Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017). Appellate counsel, like trial counsel, have a duty to zealously
represent their respective clients, and a duty of candor to the Appellate Court. See I.R.P.C.
Preamble (2); I.R.P.C. 1.1; I.R.P.C. 3.1; I.R.P.C. 3.3. Appellate counsel, whether they represent
the State, a criminal defendant, or a party in a civil dispute, can neither be allowed to nor
required to ignore controlling precedent. Id. This Court must determine legal issues presented
on this appeal, based upon the applicable legal standards.
Contrary to the State’s assertion, Mr. Garnett did not raise a new “ground for
suppression” on appeal.
The State also argues that Rodriguez does not control, attempting to limit its applicability
to questions of apparent authority to consent to an “initial entry” into a residence. (Respondent’s
Brief, pp.12-14.) The State claims,
This ‘reasonable belief’ standard has no applicability to the present case, in which
the issue is not whether the officers had the authority to enter and search the
residence in the first place, but whether Officer Haines’ search of the backpack
was within the lawful scope of the search for which the officers already possessed
consent to effectuate.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.13.) The State does not support this assertion with citation to authority,
presumably because there is no such authority, and the State’s claim is without merit.
In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held,
“when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is
not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to
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search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Id. at 171 (emphasis added). The
focus in Matlock was the nature of who could consent to a search, and the Court did not
distinguish between real and personal property. See generally, Matlock.
In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a search conducted
pursuant to consent given by a third party who the officers reasonably, but erroneously, believed
had authority to consent to the search was nevertheless valid. 497 U.S. at 179. The Court started
its analysis by noting, “[t]he Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a
person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects. Id. at 181 (citing
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
(emphasis added)). The Court continued, “[t]he prohibition does not apply, however, to
situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose
property is searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d
854 (1973), or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises, see United
States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S., at 171, 94 S.Ct., at 993.” Id.
The Rodriguez Court found that the person who gave the officers consent to enter the
premises in question did not have actual authority to grant consent. Id. at 181-82. The Court
then considered the State’s argument that the officer’s entry was nevertheless valid because the
officers “reasonably believed” the person who gave the consent had the authority to do so. Id. at
182. The Court held,
The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant
because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has
consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they
enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe
they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.
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Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state,
As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... ‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’ ” that the consenting party had authority over the
premises? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968). If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless
authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid.
Id. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
While the State accurately points out that the specific question before the Rodriguez
Court was whether such apparent authority justified the initial entry of the residence, there is
simply nothing in the opinion that indicates the Court intended to limit the “reasonable belief”
standard adopted in Rodriguez to the initial entry into a residence. Id. at 179-89. The Court did
not distinguish or limit the holding in Matlock, recognizing third party consent to the search of
“premises or effects” as valid against the defendant, to the facts in that case, nor did it express
that its holding was limited to the initial entry of the premises. Id. The Rodriguez Court did not
need to explicitly state its “reasonable belief” standard for determining apparent authority applies
to effects, because no effects were searched in that case under the guise of apparent authority.
Id. Consent to search granted by a person having the lawful authority to provide such consent is
an exception to the warrant requirement – the “reasonable belief” standard articulated in
Rodriguez, is the standard the Supreme Court adopted for lower courts to measure whether the
person who granted consent had the apparent authority to do so.
The State provides no logical basis for why Rodriguez should be limited to the entry and
search of residences, but should not apply to the search of personal property, and it cites to no
cases in support of its assertion. The Idaho Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has addressed
this issue and found that the “reasonable belief” standard applies when the State seeks to justify
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the search of an effect based upon apparent authority. In State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817
(Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether officers could
search a backpack found within a motel room occupied by multiple people, when the person who
rented the room gave permission to search. Id. at 819-20. The Court recognized that ”The issue
presented … [was] not Gallagher’s apparent authority to consent to a search of the motel suite
but her apparent authority to consent to a search of one particular container in the suite.” Id. at
823. Noting the standard articulated in Rodriquez controlled, the Westlake Court held “the facts
known to the officers did not warrant a reasonable belief that Gallagher had authority to consent
to the search of the backpack.” Id. at 823-27.
The State’s argument that Rodriguez does not apply is without merit.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in his Appellant’s Brief and herein, Mr. Garnett respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, and reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2018.

/s/ Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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